WESTMINSTER REFLECTIONS

Governments around the world are struggling to react to the increasing pace and complexity of both domestic and international events, and the rise of new technologies. I chair the Liaison Committee’s inquiry into the effectiveness of strategic thinking in government, and there are interesting lessons for all governments to be drawn from the UK’s highly successful covid vaccines task force during the crisis. Is this a model of a major government procurement programme?

Dame Kate Bingham’s book, Long Shot: The Story of the Vaccines Taskforce tells the story of what was achieved. Dame Kate is keen to give others credit for their work during the pandemic, so the first half of the book reads as an extended list of acknowledgments. The taskforce was disbanded as soon as she left, and even Whitehall appears to have failed to learn and implement ready lessons for any reform-minded government.

Dame Kate never was a civil servant, rather a venture capitalist with a Harvard MBA and decades of experience in the biotech sector. She brought in external experts, notably Clive Dix, who collaborated closely with industry to evaluate the efficacy of various vaccines. Reading Long Shot revealed that bringing in outside experts was only part of the story. Despite the Vaccine Taskforce’s unique setup—with a direct mandate from the prime minister—Dame Kate emphasises, “We always respected the key principles of civil service practice.” The Taskforce’s external team provided expert advice, while the core administrative tasks, project management, and regulatory compliance were executed by civil servants within the Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, under the leadership of Nick Elliot, a Ministry of Defence official appointed by the Cabinet Secretary, the head of the UK civil service. Dame Kate, appointed directly by the Prime Minister, had not met Nick prior to her appointment.

There are interesting lessons for all governments to be drawn from the UK’s highly successful covid vaccines task force during the crisis. Is this a model of a major government procurement programme?

The Vaccine Taskforce enjoyed a notable degree of independence from other government departments. Clive and his expert team compiled a shortlist of promising vaccines. Although smaller manufacturers required more upfront payment, this arrangement enabled us to manage supply chains effectively. Maddy McTernan, a government lawyer who later succeeded Nick Elliott as Director General of the Vaccine Taskforce, developed the contracts. These outlined the doses, delivery schedules, including priority access, costs, and other contractual terms. Nick Elliott would then present these contracts to the civil servant leading the Business Department. Subsequently, the taskforce would propose a business case to the ministerial panel, comprising the Business Secretary, Health Secretary, Chief Secretary to the Treasury, and Minister of State for the Cabinet Office. However, while the approval process was uniquely streamlined, adherence to the standard Whitehall business case format, which Dame Kate argues required detailed and overly prescriptive assumptions, was still mandatory.

Dame Kate offers a nuanced reflection on striving for accountability for public money in government. The National Audit Office, led by Gareth Davies, started their audit in July 2020, two months following the establishment of the vaccine taskforce. Dame Kate critiques their lack of vaccine knowledge and views their inquiries as time-consuming. She provocatively asks, “Who audits the auditors?” In contrast, she commends the Infrastructure Projects Authority, suggesting their effectiveness is partly due to the notable presence of women in the team. Following a dispute with Health Secretary Matt Hancock, which has garnered significant attention, an agreement was reached to appoint an independent auditor, Sir Richard Sykes. Dame Kate observes that government departments were opposed to the appointment of an outside expert, as it diminished their authority. Nevertheless, Sir Richard’s audit in July 2020 was overwhelmingly positive, although he noted that more could have been done regarding human challenge trials—a critique Dame Kate accepts.

Dame Kate proposes several thought-provoking recommendations. She contends that ministers and civil servants often lack essential skills and advocates for 50 per cent of the fast stream graduate intake to have a STEM degree. The government is committed to re-establishing the National School of Government with a permanent campus, but progress is slow. Furthermore, she argues that insufficient efforts are being made to prepare for future pandemics. For instance, the Vaccine Taskforce established the National Citizens Registry, enabling online sign-ups for COVID trials—over 500,000 individuals registered. Novavax was able to expedite its phase 3 trial in the UK, realising the ease of recruitment. Remarkably, 94 per cent of registry participants indicated willingness to participate in trials beyond the COVID-19 vaccine, yet regrettably, the government allowed the registry to lapse. Similarly, the Vaccine Manufacturing Innovation Centre, created for rapid vaccine production, was sold off post-pandemic. Lord Hague’s joint report with Sir Tony Blair recommends a Pandemic Taskforce, a standing capacity to prepare for future pandemics, and a proposal that should command cross-party support.

Lord Hague’s joint report with Sir Tony Blair recommends a Pandemic Taskforce, a standing capacity to prepare for future pandemics, and a proposal that should command cross-party support

It however is fair to ask whether the lessons from the UK’s success at procuring vaccines can be applied more broadly. As Alex Azar, who led Operation Warp Speed in the US, notes, the specific conditions of the pandemic are not universally applicable. Some commentators have seized on the vaccines taskforce as a successful example of industrial policy. But the costs of lockdown were so high, that even a small chance of a successful vaccine made the programme very cost effective. It is difficult to think of other government programmes with such massive positive externalities. Yet, the principle of granting project managers greater autonomy and the strategic incorporation of external experts not only for project management but also for scrutinising technical government programmes, holds significant potential for broader application. The government has much to learn from the Vaccine Taskforce.